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Abstract 
Social sciences studied terrorism focussing mainly on causes, processes of 
recruitment, relationships with media and new media, propaganda. At the same time, 
Italian and European public opinion gave voice almost exclusively to military, political 
and economic analysis. Sociological reflection on Islamist terrorism focussed itself 
almost exclusively on the religious aspect of radicalisation of Islam, spending little 
efforts to widen the analytic perspective to the effects of ISIS actions on the 
(re)definition of the identity and the collective memory of the targeted nation. This 
article will offer a different point of view, providing a cultural sociological reading of 
Paris Attacks, aimed at understanding its performative aspects. We will approach Paris 
Attacks as an example of social drama (Turner, 1982) and will focus on the ritual efforts 
spent by France to manage, repair and define the cultural trauma (Alexander et al., 
2004) deriving from the attacks. Data will consist of a performative analysis of ISIS’s 
strategy in Europe and of the counter-terrorist demonstration held in Paris on the 9th 
of January 2015; and of a frame analysis of the speech pronounced by Francois 
Hollande on November 16th 2015, after the Paris attacks, and of all the articles 
published on the main French newspapers during the first week after the events. In 
the conclusions, we will discuss how those events help to conceive a new kind of 
cultural trauma that is typical of the age of weak events and of distrust in public 
institutions. 
Keywords: cultural trauma, frame analysis, terrorism. 
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1 Why studying the performative aspects? Terrorism as social drama 
So far, the cultural aspects of terrorism have been studied almost 
exclusively by the sociology of religion. A minor attention has been paid to the 
cultural definition of the collective identity and memory of the countries 
targeted by terrorists. Nevertheless, terrorist attacks play a significant role in 
the redefinition of collective identities, both for the victims, the terrorist 
operators and the larger global audience.  
Then, it cannot be properly understood without enquiring its cultural 
background, development, justification, representation. Before all, terrorism is 
communication: it targets public symbols, it uses media and symbols of 
identification to produce fear and affiliation, it produces frames of 
interpretation to constrain reality, it relates to rituals, ideology and religiosity.  
In this paper we will approach terrorism through the connected 
theoretical lenses of social drama and cultural trauma. The first approach 
corresponds to the very famous theory on the performative aspects of social 
conflicts introduced by Victor Turner (1982). After the British anthropologist, 
social drama takes the form of an interruption of the customary relationship 
between the social contract and collective identity of a community, deriving 
from ‘a sequence of social interactions of a conflictive, competitive, or 
agonistic type’ (Turner, 1982: 33). The social effect of this fracture is distrust 
and moral panic. Therefore, the targeted social groups need to react by 
producing and legitimating a public interpretation of the events. Turner 
suggests that this process follows four phases: the breach, the crisis, the rituals 
of redress, and the final moment of reintegration or schism. In our hypothesis, 
in the case of Paris attacks these four phases correspond to: 
1. The attacks of January and November 2015;  
2. The crisis of legitimation following the events;  
3. The civil rituals performed to repair and redress the fracture;  
4. The acts of public definition of the war against ISIS.  
To study the period of crisis, we will focus on the media coverage of the 
November attacks in Paris. We made this choice for their global relevance in 
the definition of a new terrorist era, after September 11. The corpus is 
represented by all the articles published by Le Monde, Le Figaro and Le Parisien 
in the first10 days following the attacks (i.e. 14th-23th November 2015). This 
time lapse covers the peak of attention following the attacks and the first week 
after the Presidential address of the 16th November.  
As concerns civil rituals, we will focus on the Republican March held in 
Paris after the Charlie Hebdo killings, on the 11th of January 2015. They 
represent one of the most interesting examples of civil rituals held in Western 
countries in the last decades. 
Vincenzo Romania, Serena Tozzo 
Terrorism as Ritual Process and Cultural Trauma: a Performative Analysis of ISIS’s Attacks in 
Europe 
241 
Finally, concerning the moment of public definition of the conflict, we 
will analyse the speech pronounced by Francois Hollande on November 16th 
2015. It provided an official public interpretation of the Paris attacks, it 
justified the implementation of domestic urgency measures and it asked for 
the legitimation of a growing engagement of France in international war 
conflicts against ISIS. 
As regards the concept of cultural trauma, it has been developed in the 
last years by a group of influential durkhemian sociologists. It can be defined 
as the process of redefinition of collective memory and collective identity that 
‘occurs when members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a 
horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, 
marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in 
fundamental and irrevocable ways’ (Alexander et al., 2004:1).  
Studying an historical phenomenon in terms of cultural trauma means 
focussing on the processes of definition of the actors involved (perpetrators, 
victims, other actors involved), the nature of suffering and victimhood, the 
extent of audiences (Alexander, 2003) and their relationships with victims. 
Not all dramatic events become cultural traumas. This outcome depends on 
the salience of the fracture, the mobilization of symbolic and ritual energies, 
and the centrality of the targeted group. Actually, what transform an event of 
violence in a cultural trauma is a process of framing.  
In this process, politicians and media play a pivotal role: ‘Framing 
essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects 
of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in 
such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the 
item described’ (Entman, 1993: 52). After Entman, this process has crucial 
effects: it defines the problem, it provides moral judgments, it diagnoses 
causes and suggest remedies. Enlarging our perspective on a longer time scale, 
framing means transforming cultural meanings and collective memory. Snow 
and Benford demonstrated how the mobilisation of core cultural narratives 
(Snow, Benford, 1988; Benford, Snow 2000) is what makes a frame successful, 
in this regard.  
Focussing on the institutional and public discourse following the Paris 
attacks held in January and November 2015, we will try to analyse what a kind 
of cultural trauma has been produced and how the European political and 
media actors participated in this production. 
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2 ISIS’s strategy: time and space of attacks 
To understand the role of ISIS attacks in the construction of a cultural 
trauma for Europe it is necessary to consider all its action globally, conceiving 
them as parts of a whole strategy of terror. Then, let us start considering the 
temporal and spatial distribution of the attacks. 
As regards time, since the former attacks in Paris to the last significant 
actions in Nice, and elsewhere. 26 months have passed, and this temporal 
extension represents so far the duration of the ISIS attacks in Europe. During 
2015 and 2016, we assisted to several terrorist actions conducted by operators 
directly and indirectly connected to the terrorist organisation, self-defined as 
ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. ISIS acts like a brand, a franchising of terror, 
sometimes organising directly the actions, others providing a posteriori 
justification to free riders initiatives. In terms of intensity and density, the 
organisation performed a double strategy: striking, highly intensive attacks 
were followed by less intensive but temporarily continuous actions. The 
former ones provoked several victims and a sensible threat to the collective 
identity, while the latter helped keeping a continuous public attention on the 
topic of terrorism and to develop a cultural elaboration of the events. As 
concerns the striking events, they consisted of four referential moments: firstly, 
the Charlie Hebdo Shootings (7th January 2015) in Paris, an attack to a French 
satirical journal that provoked 12 killings, and opened the season of terror in 
Europe; secondly, again in Paris, the November Attacks, i.e. the bloodiest and 
more concerted attacks to a European metropolis in the last 10 years (130 
deaths in multiple contexts from the Bataclan club to the Stade of France); 
thirdly, the Bruxelles attacks, on March 22nd 2016, where 31 people were killed 
at their airport and in the tube; finally, lastly, the Bastille Day Killings in Nice, on 
14th of July 2016, where 87 people were killed by a cargo truck deliberately 
driven into crowds on the Promenade des Anglais. Ranges of 4-10 months 
passed between these four fundamental events, but the low profile strategy 
continued in Europe, involving other countries (Denmark, Germany, 
Belgium) through repeated attacks occurring almost any month, with periods 
of stronger concentration (i.e. January-February, 2015; June-July, 2016), and 
periods of ‘silence’ (May-July, 2015).  
The conciliation between the two strategies produced an ideal ground for 
the transformation of Islamist terrorism in a social problem and a matter of 
cultural trauma for Europeans. Reports about terrorism had a daily exposure 
on European media of different kinds (press, TV, web media) and social 
media played an innovative and fundamental role in the penetration of news 
in the daily life of a very large global audience.  
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ISIS terrorist strategy as any organised terrorist action is strongly oriented 
to salience. For salience we intend here some characteristics of the events and 
of their narration who made them prominent for the media and for the larger 
public space. Terrorist strategy is based, again, on both diachronic and 
synchronic reasons and finally is performed through an attack to collective 
symbols.  
As concerns the diachronic level, Europe has become a target of 
terrorism after 10 years of relative peace. In this period, only a big terrorist 
attack stroke Europe: the double attack performed in Norway during 2011 by 
Andres Breivik, a right-wing extremist who killed 77 people in Oslo and Utøya 
for political reasons. Before it, the last bloody attacks were registered during 
March 2004 in Madrid and during July 2005 in London. Both concerted 
actions were attributed to Islamist terrorist belonging to al-Qaida networks1. 
On the second hand, while European public opinion tends to limit its 
attention to the local events, Islamist terrorism is rather a global phenomenon. 
Several bloody attacks happened synchronically all over the world and the 
attacks held in Paris (130 deaths) and Nice (87) were less ferocious then others 
that happened during 2015 in Nigeria, Sinai, Syria, Kenya, Yemen, Tunisia. In 
the official interpretation of ISIS attacks to Europe, their continuity with 
global terrorism disappeared. Underlining the exceptionality of the events, 
media and politician tended to avoid any comparison and analogy with other 
contemporary ISIS attacks all over the world. Rather, journals, politician and 
experts used to propose analogies between the Paris attacks and September 
Eleven Attacks in USA: November attacks were commonly labelled as the 
European2 9\11 (see further). Associating Paris and New York and hiding the 
analogies with other non-Western countries situation played the discursive 
function of simplifying the ISIS actions as attacks to the values of Europe and of 
Western world in a rhetoric of clash of civilization. 
Finally, the symbolic level of ISIS attacks targets spatial and temporal 
symbols of European and, lato sensu Western identity. On a spatial level, the 
attacks to the newsroom of Charlie Hebdo and to the book launch in 
Copenhagen (4th February, 2015) can be read as attacks to the freedom of 
speech and press. The attacks performed at Bataclan, Stade de France and 
cafes and bars in Paris on November 13th targeted symbols of the leisure time, 
                                                     
1 The attacks in Madrid were conducted using a series of bombings hidden in 
unattended luggage on commuter trains. They caused 191 deaths, just before the 
domestic elections. The attacks in London were conducted by 4 kamikaze (suicide 
bombers) who attacked some tube and buses stations causing 56 deaths. 
2 From here, we will use the label 9\11 to indicate the so called September 11 
attacks, that happened on 9\11\2001 in the United States of America. 
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tourism, youth identity, consumerism and free lifestyle. The attacks to the 
church in Rouen (26th July, 2016) and the multiple attacks to Jewish targets 
during the 20 months can be read as attacks to the Western religious freedom. 
3 The counter-terrorism performances: the march in January 
The social construction of Islamist terrorism as a cultural trauma has 
been performed both by ISIS and by French institutions. While ISIS used the 
clash of civilization rhetoric (Huntington, 1993) to provide killers a strong 
ideological justification for their violence, European politicians and media 
used almost the same rhetoric to justify their vulnerability, the suspension of 
civil freedoms for security reasons, the strong investment in military actions in 
Middle East and Europe (de Cock, Du Pony, 2016; Gomart, 2015; Gugle, 
2015; Yilmaz, Ҫağla, 2012). The performative aspects of counter-terrorism 
consisted of two elements: public performances (rallies, demonstrations, 
commemorations, fests of solidarity) and public institutional speeches.  
First, it must be underlined how the performative aspects of the French 
institutional counter-reaction to terrorism have shown an unusual power, in 
terms of penetration, salience and participation. Both after the Charlie Hedbo 
Shootings and after the November attacks the French president Francois Hollande 
gave life to innovative rituals of celebration of the French Republic and of its 
leading role in the definition of Western civilization.  
As regards the former, on 11th January 2015 the government organised in 
Paris and in all the other big cities in France a monumental demonstration to 
fight terrorism, to support freedom of expression and to commemorate the 
victims of the attacks. A global number of 3.7 million of French citizens 
participated to the different demonstrations (1,5 millions in Paris). On a 
performative perspective, the demonstration in Paris showed something 
unusual in the ambit of civil religion (Bellah, Hammond, 1980): as happened 
few times in recent history, 50 political leaders marched arm-in-arm guiding 
the people march, with François Hollande at the centre of the cordon and of 
the stage of the civil-ritual performance. The participants were: representatives 
of the French government, leaders of major European powers (Italy, 
Germany, Spain, United Kingdom, among the others), leaders of Eastern 
European countries, the USA State Secretary Kerry, the leaders of Israel and 
Palestine, Turkey, Egypt, Russia, Ukraine, and of different African countries, 
including dictators; and, finally, representatives of the major monotheistic 
religions (Christians, Jewish, Muslisms including the rector of the Parisian 
mosque Boubaker). At the first sight, this list included many contradictions 
and controversies: leaders of countries in war (e.g. Israel and Palestine, 
Ukraine and Russia, among others), visions of democracy in conflict, and so 
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on. But in a performative way, the representation of the suspension of those 
controversies helped France to demonstrate through the embodied sense of 
the arm-in-arm march, its power to join actors who give up their conflicts for 
a while, to support their ally.  
The march aimed both at affirming on the stage of Paris to a global 
audience the power of France in affirming the laic and republic values of 
civilisation and to demonstrate and performatively exhibit the diplomatic 
power of the country. Similarly to the symbolic selection of significant spaces 
and times made by terrorists to commit the attacks, even the counter-terrorist 
demonstration moved in a spatial-temporal setting of performative 
significance. The march started at 3pm from Place de la République, moved 
towards Boulevard Voltaire, avenue de la République, to conclude itself at 
place de la Nation. An evident symbolism that joins those places and those 
toponyms: Illuminism, nation, and the Republic, i.e. the pillars of French 
collective identity.  
As regards individual symbols, many participants, both religious 
representatives and simple people marching in the first rows, used to show 
their religious belonging as kippahs and hijabs; while the biggest part of other 
participants showed pencils and poster representing Charlie Hebdo, the French 
flag and the Rainbow flag. This intersection between religious symbols and 
symbols of the freedom of expression produced the performative effect to 
frame the attacks of ISIS as attacks to the western freedom of speech and to 
the western lifestyle. Thus, the ISIS-France conflict was framed as the 
opposition between a radical, non-secularized communitarian group against 
the avant-garde of civilization, freedom of expression, laicity. In other terms, 
event the counter-terrorist performance espoused the clash of civilization frame3 
(Huntington, 1993; contra Said, 1996).  
                                                     
3 The theory of the clash of civilization was introduced by Samuel Huntington in one 
influential article (1993) and a following book (1996), in which he suggested that 
world history was entering in a new phase, where ‘“The great divisions among 
humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. The clash of 
civilizations will dominate global politics.” Edward Said has defined the clash of 
civilization as a mythology based on two biased assumptions: “the notion that 
civilizations are monolithic and homogeneous and second how, again from Lewis, he 
assumes the unchanging character of the duality between us and them” (Said, 1998: 4). 
Tracing back this conclusion to his well-known Orientalism, Said suggested: ‘As I’ve 
argued in several of my own works, in today’s Europe and the United States what is 
described as Islam, for instance, because this is where the burden, I think of Clash of 
Civilizations thesis goes, what is described as Islam belongs to the discourse of 
Orientalism, a construction fabricated to whip up feelings of hostility and antipathy 
against a part of the world that happens to be of strategic importance for its oil, its 
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A second frame that can be recognised in the march is that of Republican 
identity. One of the most powerful National symbols showed during the 
march was a representation of a bleeding Marianne, a young lady dressed in 
white, with a crown and a mayoral sash. The personification of the Nation and 
the contemporary attribution of human feelings to her is aimed at stimulating 
national solidarity, pride, and the valorisation of national culture. Marianne’s 
blood, the blood of a hunted country is a powerful symbol, recalling a variety 
of symbolic universes connected to the body. Marianne is a national emblem 
playing different functions in French republican history (Agulhon, 1979) and 
consequent different iconologies. Ichnographically, it is represented associated 
with a variety of other symbols of different genre: republican, as the three-
coloured cockade; of emancipation (the broken chain); of power and strength 
(the guild, the lion); of national unity (the bundle), equity (the triangle), 
maternity (the naked breast). A more intangible but powerful symbol, the 
national anthem, The Marseillaise, resonated everywhere, from official 
congresses to the streets of Paris, to the stages. 
After the attacks of Paris, again, we witnessed to a flourishing of symbols 
both in the public space and in the media. A stylised drawing of the Eiffel 
Tower was used as a symbol of peace, becoming a viral image all over the 
internet, media and social representations. The blue, white and red colours of 
the French flag have coloured the pages of the newspapers, the facades of the 
monuments and even the photographs of millions of Facebook users.  
Behind these symbols, we can read different messages: they fulfil their 
most obvious function, that is to mobilize feelings of solidarity throughout the 
world. On the other hand, we can recognize an attempt to strengthen the 
sense of belonging and unity among the members of the nation, transferring 
emotions to collective totems, appealing to national pride and ‘inculcating’ a 
sense of cohesion within the group based on the communal heritage, history 
and culture. National symbols work as a ‘signification’ system that allows the 
building of a communication network that naturalizes our experience of reality 
and reassures, through membership, our collective identity (Geisler, 2005). 
As we will see this kind of frame will find a direct continuity in the 
symbolic speech pronounced by the President Francoise Hollande on the 16th 
of November, three days after the November killings. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
threatening adjacence to Christianity, it’s formidable history of competition with the 
West’ (Said, 1998: 10). 
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4 Framing the November attacks: the Hollande Speech 
In the following two paragraphs we will introduce a qualitative frame 
analysis of the primary or master frameworks (Goffman, 1974; Snow, 
Benford, 1992) used by French government and media to provide a preferred 
reading of the events4.  
 The use of a primary framework in the interpretation of uncertain events 
is a deliberate choice aiming at: promoting a causal interpretation of events, 
giving a moral evaluation of the actors and facts, providing solutions, and 
suggesting policy actions. In this sense, we assumed a strong field-
interdependence between political institutions and media.  
The day after the terrible attacks of the 13th November, the French 
President convened a joint session of the houses of parliament at the palace of 
Versailles for the 16th. This was not a random choice, but a precise 
performative exhibition of the centrality of the French state and of its power. 
The palace of Versailles is one of the most powerful historical symbols of the 
Western exercise of power. On May 1682, Louis XVI made it the seat of the 
government of the kingdom of France, the home of the king and the location 
of the royal court. All the powers of France emanated from there. It has been 
used as palace power from Louis to Charles-Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, from 
the Kingdom to the Second Republic. After 1848, only two times it hosted 
political encounters: in 2009, when President Nicolas Sarkozy convened a 
congress in reaction to the global crisis, and, indeed, in November 2015 when 
indeed President Francois Hollande convened the Congress after the Parisian 
attacks. Scheduling the joint session at the Palace of Versailles has been, in 
other terms, a rare and powerful exhibition of symbolic power, which clarified 
its nature of political ritual5. 
                                                     
4 In our approach to Paris Attacks as a social drama, we considered Hollande’s speech 
as the fourth moment. The reason why we will introduce it before the frame analysis 
of French press is theoretical. Hollande’s speech has had, in fact, such a strong 
influence in defining the media representation of the events and orienting the 
representation of the crisis toward a warfare frame. 
5 This topic has had a large development in political and in cultural sociology, thanks 
in particular to the Neodurkheimians – from Robert Bellah, to Clifford Geertz, to 
Jeffrey C. Alexander. Bellah’s Civil Religion in America (1968) applies the durkheimian 
theory, developed in the Elementary Forms (1912), of the religious dimension of any 
given community. In this contribution and in his furthers, the American scholars 
suggest that the concept of civil religion can be applied to secular societies, because their 
symbolic systems ‘relate national political structures and events to a transcendent, 
supra-political framework that defines some “ultimate” social meaning’ (Alexander, 
1988: 7). His collaborator P. Hammond (1983) limited the application of the concept 
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In the following part of the paragraph, we will enlighten the frames used 
by the President in his speech, to construct the preferred institutional 
interpretation of the events.  
The incipit of his discourse is quite significant: ‘France is at war. The acts 
committed in Paris and near the Stade de France on Friday evening are acts of 
war…. They are acts of aggression against our country, against its values, 
against its young people, and against its way of life’. In this exert, as well as in 
the rest of speech, terrorist attacks are framed, first, through the rhetoric of 
the war. This warfare frame is used to connote not only the acts of ISIS 
towards French victims, but also the French reaction against ISIS and other 
connected powers. Hollande announced in the speech ‘the need to destroy 
Daesh’, the connected threat that the attacks have ‘strengthened [their] 
determination to destroy them [Daesh]’, and the need for ‘more airstrikes on 
the Daesh stronghold of Raqqa’. Finally, the implicit association between war 
and terrorism is used also to justify the French intervention in Mali, Syria, 
Iraq: ‘the reason for my decision to intervene in Mali’, ‘we are fighting 
terrorism in Iraq’, ‘our enemy in Syria is Daesh’. Using war as a master frame 
of terrorist attacks is such and old strategy, opened by president Ronald 
Reagan during 1984 and continued by George W. Bush, who introduced the 
slogan War on Terror, after 9/11. Different scholars have spoke of new 
propaganda or public diplomacy. As explained by David Altheide, new propaganda 
                                                                                                                         
to America, because of its peculiar institutionalization of religious rituality in a secular 
democracy. A second theoretical path, from Verba and Almond (1963) to Dayan and 
Katz (1992), connects media to political ritual. In particular, it is stressed the role of 
television and other media in virtualizing the participation of a larger audience to 
political rituals. Dayan and Katz also suggest that a proper characteristic of political 
rituals is that of favouring the reconciliation and reintegration of the community, after 
events of crisis. 
Summarizing, Baringhorst enlighten the following points: ‘(1) political rituals are 
considered to be expression of an already existing normative consensus. (2) they are 
interpreted as symbolic expressions of a presupposed social integration; (3) they are 
seen as mechanisms that generate such a normative integration and (4) rituals are 
interpreted as constituents of such an integration’ (2000: 293).  
Finally, we add, 5) participation of citizens to political rituals can occur even if not 
everybody express a consensus in terms of values; 6) emotions play a crucial role in 
the transformation of the crisis in a new social state. This two aspects can be read 
both in the liminal conception of social drama by Victor Turner and in the study of 
political rituals by David Kertzer, who suggests: ‘what is important in ritual is or 
common participation and emotional involvement, not the specific rationalizations by 
which we account for the rites [...] Rituals can promote social solidarity without 
implying that people share the same values or even the same interpretation’ (1988: 67-
9). 
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goes beyond the mere construction of arguments and content, ‘is quite 
pervasive, repetitive and capable of superimposing symbolic messages’ 
(Altheide, 2009: 281). In other words, it is hegemonic. The state provides a 
strong interpretation of the events and colonizes the public’s imagination in 
this direction, providing materials and content to the media.  
Secondly, it must be enlighten how September 11 has defined a new kind 
of cultural traumas connected to terrorism. In this sense, Kaplan (2005) an 
Alexander (2006) suggested the existence of a spiral of meaning that links 
September 11 to the following cumulative traumas.  
A second frame defining the nature of the conflict is that of the clash of 
civilizations (Huntington, 1995). After Hollande, the very targets of ISIS 
attacks were the symbols of French civilization: its values, the young people 
and their lifestyles, its democracy and civil freedoms. In his speech, Hollande 
defines France as ‘a beacon for humankind’. Somehow, he used the same 
rhetoric of orientalism vs. western civilisation used by Daesh in its propaganda for 
the recruitment of foreign fighters and for the self-sacrifice of them against 
Western targets: ‘Daesh, which is fighting us because France is a country of 
freedom, because we are the birthplace of human rights’. The recall to human 
rights is a constant in the construction of orientalism (Said, 1977). As well as the 
laicity discourse, it pretends to be neutral, but is based on a Western normative 
definition of what is human and which are the rights to be guaranteed to 
humans. Therefore, it helps stigmatising non-western cultures and enforcing a 
sense of belonging based on the Us\them opposition. This generalisation has 
the wider effect of justifying political and belligerent actions in different war 
theatres referring to the same ‘civilising’ mission. Furthermore, it has the 
function of expelling any possible other explanation based on: proper war 
actions, economic reasons, conflicts in foreign affairs, internal dynamics of 
marginalisation and connected actions of crime. At the same time, framing a 
terrorist act as a war act instead of an internal mass crime justify exceptional 
actions of reaction inside the domestic territory, but it is also functional to 
justify a series of pre-existing interventions of France on external fronts of 
war.  
A third frame in Hollande speech is the Good vs. Evil rhetoric6. Again, this 
opposition is analogous to similar past rhetoric of othering of the enemy, 
                                                     
6 The definition of Good and Evil is such a rare topic in sociology. After Lemert 
(1997), this reluctancy depends on three reasons: refusal to deal with morality, 
tendency towards cultural relativism, scares attention to universals. Nevertheless, a 
significant and varied bibliography exists on this topic. 
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from the Cold War, to the war against Saddam Hussein (see Altheide, 2004; 
Alexander, 2004). In the speech, it is performed using adjectives and nouns 
defining Daesh with a strong negative connotation, as: ‘abomination’, ‘vile’, 
‘cowards’ and ‘cowardly murderers’, ‘despicable killers’, ‘barbarians’; but also 
by the religious-political adjective of ‘jihadist’. Moreover, using civilised, 
democratic, positive connotations when defining France and French people: 
‘staunch’, ‘tough’, ‘courageous’, tolerant and laic (‘France, which makes no 
distinction of colours, origins, backgrounds, religions’), globalised and open 
(‘What the terrorists were attacking was the France that is open to the world’).  
A final frame is that of ‘nationalism’ and its celebration. In the second 
paragraph of the speech, the exceptionality of both its location, the court of 
Versailles, and of the institutional situation – the joint session of the French 
Parliament – are framed through the solemnity of the moment and the need for 
national unity and social cohesion. A sub-frame connected to nationalism can 
be called the French grandeur. It includes references to ‘the strength of the 
State’, to the triumph ‘over much more fearsome enemies’, to the history of a 
country that ‘has surmounted many other trials’ and to the global support to 
France: ‘I have been receiving messages of solidarity from heads of state and 
government around the globe’. It is evident the continuity between the frames 
used in the demonstration on the 11th of January and this speech and it will be 
evident in the next paragraph a further continuity between this speech and the 
construction of a discursive space through the media.  
 
                                                                                                                         
A first approach – the one recognizable, for instance in the works of Wolff (1969) – 
defines evil as a characteristic of modern social life, connecting it to the social 
problems of alienation, erosion of meaning, burocratization in modern life.  
Further, a large part of the classical sociological production, including the works of 
Merton, Hughes, Arendt, Coser, Bauman dealt with the topic in the socio-historical 
analysis of Nazism. Common to these scholars is a tendency to separate the practices 
of evil, from their actors and to problematize how ‘evil’, as a social system, is 
organized and performed.  
Finally, an approach based on performativity, rituals and cultural trauma is nearest to 
the conception of evil provided by Robert Bellah (1971) who connects the cultural 
foundation of United States to the definition of some axes of good\evil, based on the 
religious, political and the economic ground. As for the definition of enemies or for 
otherization as a wider phenomena, a definition of evil is always connected to a 
discourse of self-definition in terms of good. However, this process of hetero and 
auto-attribution is purely pragmatic and ambivalent, as Lyman (1978) has brilliantly 
suggested. Any definition of evil answers to contingent socio-cultural contexts and to 
pragmatic reasons of self-definition and exclusion of others.  
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5 A Frame Analysis of French Press after November Attacks 
Concerning media, we collected and analysed all articles published by the 
newspapers Le Monde, Le Figaro and Le Parisien in the ten days following the 
attacks in Paris, on 13 November 2015 (November 14th to 23th). The choice 
was based on criteria of relevance, dissemination and plurality. Le Monde and 
Le Figaro in fact represent, at the same time, the first two for popular 
magazines and the cornerstones of the French newspaper journalism. Le 
Parisien is the fourth best-selling newspaper in France, with a circulation of 
215,000 copies a day. Its relevance in the events is given by an obvious 
territorial dimension, but also by the relevance of the regional press in the 
French context (De Cock, Du Pont, 2016). Finally, from a political point of 
view those three broadcasts show balanced and differentiated editorial 
policies: Le Monde has a center-left orientation, Le Figaro a center-righteous 
and Le Parisien shows a substantial political neutrality. 
The period of observation of the corpus was instead dictated by 
theoretical reasons. For our research it was crucial to consider the primary 
frameworks attributed to the events in the first phase of history next to them, 
i.e. when the attacks themselves suspended the normal course of daily life and 
required a collective reflection catalysing the public opinion and the public 
sphere. In these phases of institutional and interpretive crisis (the phase 2 of 
Turner’s social drama model) media reveal best their role in the social 
construction of reality. They communicate under conditions of uncertainty, 
and yet, provide answers to the events characterised by disambiguation. It is in 
this gap between uncertainty and disambiguation that the performative aspect 
of the social construction can be better captured. Disambiguation, indeed, 
plays a crucial function: it is oriented to the political reasons of social 
cohesion, institutional and moral trust and consensus building. Globally, we 
collected and analyses 334 articles: Le Monde, 101; Le Figaro, 135; Le Parisien, 
98. 
The relationship between media and power in France must be 
understood within the particular structure of the country and of its media 
system (Lamizet, 2013). As regards French Republic, its imaginary is based on 
the voluntary participation of citizens to republican values of liberty, equality 
and fraternity, but is still understood as an expression of secularism, which 
first means the prevalence of the State on collective cultures and cultural 
pluralism. As concerns the relationship between Press and political power, 
French government has always played a strong control or influence on press, 
pushing towards and educational model of representation, and favouring an 
over-use of editorials and comments (D’Almeida, Delporte, 2010). 
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5.1 The warfare frame 
The already mentioned primary framework of the ‘war’ found a clear 
correspondence in the French media coverage. Faced with an event so 
upsetting and frightening for the population as a terrorist attack in the heart of 
the capital, media played a crucial role during the first phase of public 
uncertainty. As mediators between political leaders and the population, 
journalists play a decisive role in the perception of the event and on their 
effects on public opinion. Therefore, their power derives from the effects of 
penetration, in terms of resonance – i.e. the credibility of actors, the frameworks 
of interpretation and salience (Snow, Benford, 1988). 
The ‘war’ declared by Holland became the ‘war’ narrated by the 
newspapers. In the analysed texts, the presence of this metaphor is dominant: 
titles such as ‘War in Paris’7, ‘Holland, the Politics in time of war’8, ‘C’est la 
guerre’9, ‘When the youth of France enters war’10, ‘The war continues’11 
occupy the covers and the first pages of the newspapers in the days following 
the attacks. These lexical choices enlighten the intention of the journalists to 
adhere to the Presidential warfare frame. We can recognize here all the power 
that resides in the linguistic device of the metaphors. It models public 
perceptions, conceptions and believes towards a phenomenon to the point 
that the metaphor – the war – and the object in question – the attacks – create 
the same image, the telemorphosis of terrorism (Baudrillard, 2002).  
As in Hollande’s speech, the lexical analysis of the articles shows a 
predominant use of the metaphor of the war, clearly preferred to the frame of 
crime. Words that are part of the lexical field of crime, such as victims, justice, 
murder, criminal act are much less recurring than others clearly related to the 
frame of war, such as ally, battlefield, target, battle, fight, conflict, curfew, enemy, 
conquer, strategy. The term ally is used to connect war to the us-and-them-frame 
(see 5.3) In some article ally identifies the Western nations. In others, potential 
entities to be defined: ‘to the eyes of all our current and potential allies on the 
field, the war against the Islamic State is the number one priority’12; ‘which 
allies against daesh, what means of war, what methods?’13. 
The word target [cible in French] is used to connote the terrorist targets as 
war objectives: 
                                                     
7 Le Figaro, 14th November, 2015. 
8 Le Monde, 17th November, 2015. 
9 Le Monde, World, 16th November, 2015. 
10 Le Figaro, 17th November, 2015. 
11 Le Figaro, 19th November, 2015. 
12 Le Figaro, 17th November, 2015. 
13 Le Figaro, 18th November, 2015. 
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‘The targets [cibles] are carefully chosen for the symbols that they 
embody’.14  
‘We know that in theory, for the Islamic State, every Western ... carries 
with him\her a target [cible] in front of or on the heart’.15 
‘In the symbolism of the targets [cible] that are linked to their hatred, we 
respond with our pride’.16 
The constitution of the warfare framework is performed also through direct 
and indirect discourse, i.e. quotations. The quotation has already interested the 
field of study of the CDA because, even if its use can convey a resemblance of 
objectivity and authenticity, it has a precise function in the media discourse 
(Fairclough, 1995). It is never a mere reproduction, but rather a 
representation, which reflects and reproduces the underlying ideology of 
newspapers. Especially direct citations are carefully selected between official 
speeches and declarations in order to frame a given reality. We can show some 
example in the analysed articles: 
France will be ‘pitless’ (Hollande) and intends to ‘annihilate’ the 
enemies (Valls).17  
‘France is at war against assassins,’ said the head of state. Everyone 
agrees.18  
‘It is an act of war that has been prepared, organized, planned from the 
outside and with internal complicities that the investigation will 
establish,’ said Francois Hollande, on Saturday.19 
The use of citations plays the dual function of strengthening the 
framework of ‘war’ and presenting events as evident and established, as 
already framed by the actors’ policies (Fairclough, 2001; Garcin-Marrou, 
2001). Through the inclusion of selective quotations, media content reflects 
the dominant institutional attitudes by legitimizing them (Fairclough 1995): if 
the head of state said: ‘France is at war against the assassins’, then ‘Everyone 
agrees’. This also implies that, according to the journalist, everyone – that is to 
say all the French people – share the same visions and opinions. This is a 
typical device used to homogenize the national group and to hide the political 
fragmentation of the country. 
                                                     
14 Le Monde, 16th November, 2015. 
15 Le Figaro, 17th November, 2015. 
16 Le Monde, 19th November, 2015. 
17 Le Figaro, 16th November, 2015. 
18 Le Figaro, 17th November, 2015. 
19 Le Monde, 17th November, 2015. 
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5.2 The clash of civilization frame The warfare frame 
Analysing the co-occurences of the world ‘war’, we can find several 
expressions belonging to the political and military vocabulary, such as ‘civil 
war’, ‘war of civilization’, ‘holy war’, ‘war of religion’, ‘urban war’, ‘total war’. 
In this article, there is no space enough to consider the religious element. We 
will just briefly report that public opinion in France and all over Europe has 
been divided in two political parts with relative visions about the relationship 
between terrorism and Islam. The more xenophobic part stressed that the 
origins of terrorism is in the background of Islam and that terrorist acts 
descend directly from Muslim principles. The more progressive part 
maintained the absence of any relationship – ‘pas de amalgame’ – between 
Islam and ISIS. A quick reading of the newspapers seems to confirm their 
adherence to the collective will to refuse the amalgam between Islam and 
terrorism. Nevertheless, the use of ‘holy war’ and ‘war of religion’ is very 
common in the article we analysed. Between the lexical and the conceptual 
level, we noticed a clear contradiction. 
Finally, consider the following exert: ‘They [web surfers] also post 
Marianne’s faces or the Eiffel tower stylised as a sign of peace... Always in 
blue, white and red. Read the texts of the Internet users. They assert a strong 
message: in the face of barbarism, we French people resist to the assassins, we 
are not afraid of them’.20 
Again, through the personal pronoun ‘We\Us’ the journalist speaks on 
behalf of all the French, assuming a uniformity of intents and ideas for the 
whole group. According to the journal, the message conveyed by the national 
symbols that flourished in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, is a message 
of solidarity, but also, above all, a message of resistance against the threat of 
terrorism, and of the ‘barbarity’ of the ‘assassins’. 
The use of the word ‘barbarism’ recalls the linguistic choices made by 
Hollande in his speech and shows us how some words are used strategically 
for shaping the public perception of events. Defining ‘barbarian’ one of the 
two parts of an opposition, necessarily implies considering the other as the 
symbol and the carrier of civilization. Indeed, the civilized vs. barbarian 
opposition is crucial for redressing the cultural trauma, as Benjamin and 
Todorov suggested in their books (Benjamin, 1974; Todorov, 2009). The 
barbarian is the necessary point of comparison of any identity construction 
based on ethnocentrism. As more as one’s ethnocentric identity perceives 
some weakness, as more the opposition becomes vital (Walzer, 1999).  
                                                     
20 Le Monde, Cultures et Idees, 16th November, 2015. 
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5.3 The Us and Them-frame 
A third frame used in press representation is the Us and Them frame. The 
enunciated us is post-ethnical, post-cultural, post-religious. It is based on the 
emancipation of the subject, and on the recognition of the democratic values 
of the Constitution and of the capitalist production model. Conversely, jihad is 
represented as an old-fashioned commitment, a closure within the community, 
a sense of religious construction of the present, opposite to modernity and 
incompatible with present time.  
The ‘us’ used in the articles refers to the whole French people who share 
a common identity and who are in binary opposition to the ‘other’, ‘the 
enemies of the Republic’. The choice of the journalists to use the pronouns 
‘we\us’ shows their willingness not only to address French people, but also to 
speak on behalf of the entire French community (Van Dijk, 1995; Brookes, 
1999; Fortanet, 2004). They feel authorised in it, when they say that the 
French ‘went to war’21 and when they speak of the ‘war effort’ they must 
‘lead’22, assuming homogeneity and uniformity of thought within the group. 
The authority whose journalists feel invested is reinforced by other linguistic 
expedients, like the use of conjugated verbs in the imperative – ‘let’s get 
together’ (Fortanet 2004) – or the use of modal verbs as ‘we must’ and ‘we 
will need’, that are very common in the corpus. According to Fairclough 
(1995), modal verbs reveal the position of authority implicitly adopted by the 
author towards others, who in our case assumes the role of representative and 
guide of the people.  
Othering is accomplished by the use of linguistic devices of categorization 
and labelling. It takes place primarily by geo-political categories that act on the 
structures of actorial pertinence of the narration, suggesting a consequentiality 
between belonging to a nation or religious identity and the willingness to carry 
out terrorist actions. In Parisian attacks it was possible to register a 
fundamental difficulty in the othering process, given the French citizenship of 
the young terrorists who made the attacks. They were born or raised in France 
and they were socialized to a European Islam. Discursively, this difficulty was 
circumvented by combining, even improperly, French citizenship to the 
nation of origin of the families. Terrorists have then been identified as 
French-Algerian, Franco-Tunisian and so on. This combination led to an 
essentialisation of culture: the cultural substratum has been reified in the 
representation, giving it a biological base.  
                                                     
21 Le Figaro, 21st November, 2015.  
22 Le Monde, 20th November, 2015.  
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A second language device of othering is represented using terms such as 
jihadists. On the one hand it marks an absolute strangeness of the actors; 
secondly, it suggests a monolinear relationship between religion and terrorist 
action; thirdly, it provides a bombers’s profiling; fourthly, it provides an 
imaginary about terrorism and an exoteric religious world, made of desert 
training camps, jeep occupied by bloodthirsty warriors waving black flags, 
cities destroyed and dismembered bodies. ISIS’ reality, it is worth repeating, is 
much more complex.  
5.4 The Nationalist frame  
National symbols are a system of signification, which allows building a 
communication, naturalizing our experience of reality, reassuring us on our 
collective identity, strengthening our belonging to a culture (Geisler, 2005). 
In the analysed newspapers, we found articles entirely devoted to national 
symbols, such as ‘When Marseillaise makes the Congress vibrate’ (Le Figaro, 
17th November 2015, p.2) or ‘Planet Blue-white-red’ (Le Monde, 21st 
November 2015). The attempt to strengthen the sense of national unity which 
is evoked by national symbols can also be found in other elements of the 
texts. An example is the recurrence of the rhetorical figure of the personification. 
With this metaphorical device, authors give life to what Wodak et al. called a 
‘constructive strategy’ by demanding identification with an anthropomorphic 
nation. Consider the following examples: 
‘Paris never dies’. (Le Figaro, 18th November 2015); ‘France is crying. She 
is not afraid.’ (Le Parisien, 15th November 2015); ‘[...] a free, courageous and 
fraternal France, capable of assembling and to face the threats’. ((Le Parisien, 
19th November 2015). 
In this narration, France plays an actorial role, showing the characteristics 
of human beings such as crying, acting ‘facing the threats’, feeling emotions 
like fear, freedom, courage, fraternity. We can recognize here an attempt to 
identify readers with the nation and to transmit a sense of participation of 
people to an imagined community, consistent with the symbolization of the 
Marianne shown during the Republican march. This confirms the important 
role that metaphors play, along with other linguistic and symbolic elements, in 
the mental construction of the nation (Billig, 1995). These elements are part of 
a broader constructive strategy of assimilation, continuation and inclusion in 
the group, which implies the exclusion of those who do not belong to it, or 
the exclusion of those which do not conform to its values. 
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6 Discussion: on cultural trauma and civil religion  
Our outcomes show a strong continuity between primary frames used to 
construct the Parisian attacks through civil rituals, institutional speeches and 
media discourse, on a first hand; and between the French construction of a 
cultural trauma and the war on terror rhetoric used by Americans, during Cold 
War and after September Eleven, on a second hand. From a media studies 
perspective, we have shown a strong field-dependence between political 
power and newspapers in France, consisting with the DeFleur and Ball-
Rokeach approach (1982).  
From a performative point of view, this continuity can be better 
interpreted has a case of cultural trauma. In the rituals we analysed, what 
emerges is a framework of opposition between a civilization based on the 
pillars of French Revolution and a guilt-free massacre – in the same sense of 
Duster23 (1971) – conducted by a representative of an enemy civilization. Its 
transformation in a cultural trauma has been leaden through a strong 
emotional recall to national unity, social cohesion, and national symbols as 
devices of repair; othering symbols of differentiation, and clash of civilization 
rhetoric, as devices for defining the impossibility of a reconciliation. This 
choice had he pragmatic effect of taking back the State in the public sphere, 
creating consensus around the suspension of civil freedoms and the 
introduction of exceptional measures of social control, profiling a precise, but 
ambivalent, enemy of the Nation: Islamic radicalism, but in a certain measure 
Islam as a whole; defining an enlarged audience, including all Western and 
non-Western countries. 
 Furthermore, the outcomes allow us to discuss on civil religion and 
cultural trauma. As Turner (1982) suggested, rituals play both a structural and 
an anti-structural function. They have a function of regulating social life, but, 
at the same moment, they dissolve and recreate a sense of community, 
performatively, during their liminoid phase. Therefore, the rituals following 
Paris Attacks supported the production of a new National pride, based on the 
founding values of French Revolution and on the opposition to the perfect 
counter-referent: radicalism. The cultural trauma has been declined has the 
opposition between two forms of mythization: the positive mythization of 
French Revolution, and of its practical application in nowadays French 
                                                     
23 Duster (1971) listed six elements that characterize a de-humanized massacre, like 
the ones conducted by terrorists in Paris: public faith in the organizational arm of 
violence, downgrading of individual grounds for action, fragmentation of distributive 
responsibility in organizations, secrecy, a vulnerable population, the development of a 
motivation for massacre. 
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society; and the negative mythization of Islam (Liogier, 2012), as the reign of 
Evil.  
In the Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912), Emile Durkheim used 
French Revolution as the example par excellence of a moment revealing ‘the 
attitude of society for setting itself up’. Analysing the civil celebration of the 
values and historical memory of 1789, he expressed his very well-known 
theory of the symbolic and religious nature of society: ‘Society and its essential 
ideas become, directly and with no transfiguration of any sort, the object of a 
veritable cult…things purely laical by nature were transformed by public 
opinion into sacred things’ (1915: 245). The principles of the Revolution 
themselves became a religion ‘which has had its martyrs and apostles, which 
has profoundly moved the masses, and which, after all, as given birth to great 
things’ (Hunt, 1988: 35). 
In this sense, in our opinion, the reaction to Paris Attacks showed a new 
form of civil religious rituals (Bellah, Hammond, 1980) which became typical 
of the age of weak events (Baudrillard, 2003). In this time, the performative 
power embodied both in the spirit of terrorism and in the aesthetic of 
globalization imposes a new performative affirmation of the State, through 
rituals and through the celebration of a domestic cultural memory. Indeed, 
national dramas following mass crimes are more and more the (media) events 
(Dayan, Katz, 1996) where the State shows itself more powerfully. The 
transformation of dramatic events in cultural traumas is more likely to happen 
in nations, as France, where cultural memory is linked to strong myths of the 
origins of the State, as for the 1789 Revolution; and when historical processes 
are more likely to produce a mythization of the opponent: Islam, as we said. It 
is not a case that the following Bastille Day killings in Nice targeted the 
temporal symbol (July, 14th 2016) of France Republic foundation. 
Belligerent conflict is then transformed in a symbolic war between global 
actors who use well-known cultural narratives to justify the perpetuation of 
their political, and economic interests. With any possible, symbolic and non-
symbolic, mean.  
Finally, discussing the cultural trauma theory, we can intend the Paris 
Attacks as an historical moment which, differently from Holocaust, revealed a 
proper cultural failure of secularism and laicity model in the modern Nation 
State (Seligman, 2008).  
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